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This article describes the trends in Dutch executive pay contracts. To increase our 
insight into this subject area, we conducted an empirical study on the basis of 
remuneration data provided by the executive board members of 71 Dutch listed 
companies over the period 2002-2004. The study starts from the premise that the 
characteristics of a unique corporate governance regime, together with the 
environmental context, shape compensation arrangements. Based on a theoretical 
research study, which combines our empirical research results with a literature 
overview, we argue that an optimal compensation arrangement is a trade-off 
among complying with corporate governance standards, optimizing potential 
incentives, preventing perverse incentives and offering a competitive pay package. 
It appears that this trade-off differs with each company at any moment in time. The 
relevance of this study may be threefold. First, its results can help shape the public 
debate about the pay of top executives in the Netherlands. Second, it could serve 
as a blueprint for future research on executive compensation in the specific 
context of the Dutch governance system. Furthermore, it could help remuneration 




One could regard the Dutch corporate governance system as a combination 
of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental-European governance systems2. A study of 
how executive compensation practices have evolved in such a landscape is 
therefore an interesting one. Since a couple of years now, Dutch executive 
compensation and corporate governance practices have been the subject of a 
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heated debate. Large share price increases and subsequent option gains in the 
late ’90s led former Dutch prime-minister Wim Kok, as one of the first, to 
openly agitate against the ‘exhibitionistic self-enrichment’ of top executives. 
Since then, in 2002, the disclosure of the remuneration data of all individual 
members of the executive board was made compulsory; each year around 
springtime, when excessive amounts of compensation are revealed, a carnival of 
social outrage and debate breaks out. 
 
In addition, as a result of the accounting scandals at the beginning of the 
21st century, the Dutch corporate governance environment has profoundly 
changed. The prime exponent of this changing corporate governance 
environment was the implementation of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code 
in 2003, more commonly referred to as the Tabaksblat Code3. The combination 
of a unique governance system and a rapidly changing business environment 
makes Dutch executive compensation an interesting topic for research. This 
research could shed light on the influence of the public pressure on and political 
interference in compensation practices in an environment of increasing 
shareholder pressure, in which shareholder value creation has become the prime 
measure of business success.  
 
2. SCOPE AND BACKGROUND 
 
Typical of the Dutch corporate governance regime is its two-tier board 
structure in which the executive board (‘Raad van Bestuur’) is responsible for 
the daily operations of the firm and the supervisory board (‘Raad van 
Commissarissen’) carries out the tasks of appointing, monitoring, suspending 
and dismissing (if necessary) the members of the executive board as well as 
assessing and ratifying major business decisions. The members of the 
supervisory board are appointed by co-optation for a four-year term (Van Ees et 
al., 2003). Under the influence of a number of Anglo-Dutch companies and the 
increase in Anglo-Saxon shareholdings, one can observe a slow shift in 
preference for the Anglo-Saxon unitary board structure. 
 
In the past, this system could be characterized by a large degree of 
protectionism and managerial entrenchment. By issuing preference shares, 
tradable depository receipts and priority shares with limited voting rights as 
well as installing administration offices, ownership was effectively separated 
from control, thereby ensuring take-over defences in the case of a hostile take-
over bid. This has led to an investor-unfriendly governance climate, the so-
                                                 
3 Named after Morris Tabaksblat, who chaired the committee, which consisted of several 
representatives of different stakeholder groups.  
(See: http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.nl). 
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called ‘Dutch discount’ on all Dutch share prices4. Until a couple of years ago, 
a market for corporate control hardly existed and the Annual Meeting of 
Shareholders only had a limited influence. The co-optation principle and the 
large influence of the executive board on the appointments of the supervisory 
board have furthermore led to a high degree of managerial entrenchment (Van 
Ees and Postma, 2004). The popular media have often referred to this 
phenomenon as the ‘old boys network’, in which the small business community 
in the Netherlands has divided all ‘sideline-jobs’5 among one another6. In this 
context, the large increases in executive pay have also been considered as a 
favour among friends. 
 
In the last two decades, however, a series of economic, technical and 
societal developments have significantly changed the governance structures in 
the Netherlands. First, the increasing globalization of the business environment 
has changed the Dutch corporate structures. Internationally oriented for some 
time now, Dutch companies have made a new series of acquisitions in many 
parts of the world, making the current business processes even more globally 
dispersed. In 2004, on average 58% of the turnover of the largest listed 
companies and 71% of that of the 25 AEX companies were realized abroad. On 
top of this, an increasing number of business functions and processes have been 
outsourced or transferred to low-cost countries. The increasing competitiveness 
on a global level has had a quick impact on businesses that underperform, 
which has stimulated discipline in the product markets. 
 
The labor market for executives has also internationalized rapidly. The 
percentage of foreign CEOs at AEX companies doubled in only two years from 
24% in 2002 to 48% in 20047. These CEOs all bring different attitudes to the 
boardroom, which subsequently have an impact on the corporate governance 
standards. These attitudes involve, for example, issues such as the role of 
shareholders, the role of the supervisory board and executive remuneration. The 
globalization of the managerial labour market has increased competitiveness 





                                                 
4 Because of these take-over barriers Dutch shares were traded with discounts of up to 20% in 
comparison with the shares of foreign peers.  
5 Ironically, for a long time these directors merely considered supervisory board membership as a 
sideline-job, with only limited responsibilities, while having an almost unlimited trust in the 
capabilities of the executive directors. 
6 See: http://www.elite-research.org/man1.html?/topmanagers.html  
7 See: http://www.mb.utwente.nl/oohr/events/past/HRMfirst/presentations/keynote.pps  
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3. CONCEPTS AND METHODS 
 
The main objective of this paper is to present the real facts on executive 
compensation in the Netherlands. Our empirical study has focused on the 
remuneration practices of 71 Dutch listed companies. Since 2002, all Dutch 
companies that are listed have been required to disclose the remuneration 
figures of the individual members of the executive board in their annual 
accounts. The number of companies that are listed on the Dutch Stock 
Exchange (‘Euronext Amsterdam’) is, however, rather limited (approximately 
150 companies) and the differences in firm size among these companies are 
considerable. Therefore, since remuneration practices are only reasonably 
developed at large companies, the relevance of the results and the comparability 
with other studies8 would decrease if all small companies were included. This is 
why we made a selection of the most prominent and largest companies, which 
has resulted in 75 enterprises.  
 
Two additional criteria were formulated: 1) the companies should be of 
Dutch origin or be engaged in substantial managerial activities on the corporate 
level in the Netherlands9 and 2) the company may not have been taken-over by 
another company or be involved in a large restructuring process in the period 
under review, which has caused to change the position, job and responsibilities 
of the executives. Two companies were left out because of these requirements. 
After revision of the data, two more companies were left out because the 
information they provided was incomplete (base salary and bonus figures).  
 
The remuneration data cover three different years: 2002, 2003 and 2004. In 
2002, firms disclosed their individual remuneration data in their annual 
accounts for the first time. The 2004 data were the most recent available figures 
at the time of research. In some cases, (qualitative) data on the 2005 
remuneration package were taken into account, but only if published in the 2004 
annual reports. 
 
The executive board of directors includes three positions: the Chief 
Executive Officer (‘CEO’), Chief Financial Officer (‘CFO’) and the other 
members of the executive board. The roles and responsibilities of the other 
                                                 
8 Most international studies only contain the largest listed companies of the country in question. 
In the United States most samples are made of S&P 500 companies and in the United Kingdom 
they mostly consist of FTSE 100 or FTSE 250 companies. 
9 A number of foreign companies use a Dutch listing and holding company primarily for tax 
purposes, but do not have substantial corporate and operational activities in the Netherlands. 
Although the principles of the Tabaksblat Code do apply to these companies, it is likely that in 
these cases the data reflect their remuneration practices in the country where they perform their 
primary corporate activities. 
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members of the board are, in general, too diverse to make a representative 
division and categorization10. We only included executive directors in our 
study. Furthermore, we did not take the remuneration of supervisory board 
directors (non-executive directors) into account.  
                                                
 
The companies forming the population of this study are those that are part 
of one of the two main stock indices (the AEX Stock Index and the AMX Stock 
Index (‘Midkap’), both consisting of 25 companies and the 25 largest 
companies ranked by turnover (‘Small Caps’), which are not part of one of 
these indices. Due to the large variations in size and complexity among these 
companies, we analyzed these subgroups independently. The average turnover 
of the companies in the population in 2004 was €9.4 billion, the average market 
value was €5.8 billion, and the average number of employees was 26,861. 
 
4. DATA COLLECTION 
 
Since there are no databases that contain Dutch executive compensation 
figures, we collected all data from publicly available sources, such as the 
remuneration sections in the annual accounts of companies. Furthermore, we 
made use of all other publicly available information, such as the Corporate 
Governance section on companies’ websites, additional remuneration reports, 
LTI plan regulations, employment contracts, information concerning annual 
shareholders meetings and SEC filings. We approached a few companies with 
the request to supply crucial additional information, to which some of them 
responded positively. 
 
Despite the regulations and prescriptions concerning transparency, as well 
as the publication of remuneration data, a considerable amount of the data had 





The analysis on Dutch remuneration practices resulted in the detection of 
several trends regarding Dutch executive compensation. Firstly, we found that 
the principles of the Tabaksblat Code have had a considerable impact on the 
Dutch remuneration practices. Although not legally binding, companies that do 
not conform to the majority of the principles are signalled out by the business 
press, investors or shareholder associations, and can count on heavy criticism in 
 
10 The other members have responsibilities varying from product division to geographic or 
functional responsibilities. Their legal status as executive board members is, however, the same 
(collective responsibility). 
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publications or at annual shareholder meetings. Thus, in the past few years, this 
influence had led most companies to review and reconstruct their incentive 
plans. Secondly, a clear shift from traditional stock option plans to other forms 
of equity-based pay (performance shares) were found.  
 
A strong increase in the number of companies that have implemented 
deferred bonus plans was observed. A clear shift from traditional stock option 
plans to other forms of equity-based pay - in particular, performance shares. 
During the time this study was conducted, it was expected that in 2005, the 
percentage of companies that granted performance shares would have risen to 
57.8% (from 9.9% in 2002), whereas only 45% of the companies would still 
grant stock options (from 71.8% in 2002). It can therefore be concluded that 
there seems to be a clear preference for performance shares. In particular, 
performance measures such as performance share plans in combination with 
relative TSR seem to become the new standard in LTI compensation. Finally, 
we found a rise in equity-based compensation has led to a sharp increase in the 
value of the executive’s total compensation package.  
 
Total compensation of executives augmented to 6.8% in the two-year 
period 2002-2004, but with a much larger increase in the last year. In particular, 
the executives of AEX companies saw large increases in their total 
compensation (28.6% for the CEO). These amounts were the result of increases 
in all components of the pay package and were, in particular, triggered by 
increases in the value of equity-based compensation. The equity-based pay 
package (options and shares) of the CEO rose an astonishing 70.8% in the 
2002-2004 period. In the following section, the observed trends and 
developments will be further outlined. 
 
On the basis of our data, we could identify three major trends and other 
developments in Dutch executive compensation. In short, the trends relate to 
revised incentive plans and compensation and to a changed focus on the 
importance of the supervisory board.   
 
TREND 1: A  revision of the incentive plan structures and a renewed focus 
on the discretionary power of the supervisory board. 
 
One major consequence of the reforms in the incentive plans has been that 
most performance measures in the incentive plans are now ‘previously 
determined, measurable and influential’11. This holds for the performance 
                                                 
11 The Tabaksblat Code has expressed a clear preference for objective performance measurement. 
It states specifically that the ‘the variable part shall be linked to previously-determined, 
measurable and influenceable targets’. 
 66
Management, Vol. 14, 2009, 2, pp. 61-79 
D. Swagerman, E. Terpstra: Trends in Dutch executive compensation 
measures in the annual bonus plan as well as for the performance measures that 
determine the vesting of the long-term incentive grant.  
 
On the other hand, one can observe a trend in which an increasing part of 
the annual bonus is determined by the discretionary judgment of the supervisory 
board. In 2004, almost 67% of the companies had adopted individual or 
qualitative performance measures, which both have a strong discretionary 
character and, on average, make up 28% of the bonus opportunity. Despite the 
push for objective performance measurement, supervisory board directors are 
apparently of the opinion that a discretionary judgment of the performance of 
the executive board is a valuable measure.  
 
Objective versus subjective performance measurement 
 
The plea for objective performance measurements made by the Tabaksblat 
Committee is grounded in the belief that the procedures for a bonus setting 
might not have been fair. By tying the bonus to subjective performance 
measures, executives can still be compensated even when their performance is 
poor (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). The Dutch corporate elite has often been 
accused of being an ‘old boys network’, in which personal friendships and 
business relations influence the supervision function of the supervisory board 
directors. As a consequence, supervisory board directors might treat befriended 
executive directors favorably, or they might be influenced by executive board 
members12.  
 
Although objective performance evaluation offers the advantage of 
perceived fairness and visibility, it also has several disadvantages compared to 
subjective performance evaluation. In many jobs, individual performance 
cannot be measured and assessed objectively because of joint production or 
mere ‘unobservability’. Furthermore, managers can game the bonus system (e.g. 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jensen, 2001), they can be rewarded for luck instead 
of actual company performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) or rewarded 
or punished for events beyond their control. One can therefore argue that the 
decision to (partly) reward the executive on a discretionary basis corrects for 
distorted incentives and helps create a bonus reward that is perceived as more 
fair and, as a result, better reflects the real performance of the executive. 
The decision to adopt a subjective performance measurement can be 
dependent on several firm-specific factors. For example, Ittner et al. (1997) 
indicate that when a firm follows an innovation-oriented strategy or when there 
is a great deal of noise with respect to financial performance measures, the use 
                                                 
12  As a result the Tabaksblat Committee has also drawn up strict principles concerning the 
independence of the non-executive directors. 
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of non-financial measures in bonus plans increases. Bushman et al. (1996) argue 
that individual performance evaluation increases with the firm’s growth 
opportunities and product time horizon. Ittner et al. (1997) have, however, 
found no evidence that CEOs with a greater influence on the board of directors 
are more likely to be compensated on the basis of non-financial performance 
measures. It is therefore not likely that the rise in subjective performance 
measurements in Dutch executive contracts is a means to increase the overall 
compensation of executives. It is more reasonable to suggest that the shift 
toward more subjective evaluation is rooted in the wish to better award the 
executive for his or her actual performance.  
 
Consequences of the option plan design 
 
Another result of the Tabaksblat Code is that almost all option grants are 
now subject to vesting periods and performance conditions and that practically 
all options are granted at the money. Moreover, concerns often mentioned, such 
as reissuing (extending the exercise window), retesting (extending the 
performance period) and re-pricing (discounting the exercise price) are hardly 
existent anymore13. From a corporate governance point of view, this is, in 
general, considered as a positive development, but on the other hand, it limits 
the design options of the remuneration committees. They therefore hardly make 
use of design variations that can bring additional benefits, such as indexed 
options (Rappaport, 1999), cost of capital options, the possibility of adjusting 
the exercise price of paid dividends (Jensen and Murphy, 2004) or granting at a 
discount (Hall and Murphy, 2002), and are therefore hardly used. Arguments 
can also be made in favor of, for example, re-pricing, which can increase 
incentive and retention effects (Core et al., 2003).   
 
TREND 2: A shift toward an increase in equity-based compensation and 
new forms of long-term incentive plans. 
 
Besides the identified shift from traditional stock option plans to other 
forms of equity based payment,  we observed a strong increase in the number of 
companies that have implemented deferred bonus plans. At the time when we 
conducted this study, it was expected that in 2005, 25.4% of the companies 
would have implemented such a plan, often in combination with performance 
shares. They are the most popular among AEX companies. Besides these plans, 
there is also an increasing focus on the so-called ‘shareholding requirements’. 
                                                 
13 The Tabaksblat Code states that ‘options shall not be granted at an exercise price lower than the 
market price at the grant date’. It furthermore states that ‘neither the exercise price nor the other 
conditions shall be modified during the option term’.   
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Although quite a number of companies have redesigned their option plans, 
mostly by including performance standards, it is to be expected that in the near 
future only a few, or perhaps even none, will hold on to these option plans. 
Companies themselves, however, shed relatively little light on their motivations 
to change the composition of the variable pay package.  
 
Negative reputation of options and the symbolic value of shares 
 
After the corporate scandals in the beginning of the 21st century, and in 
particular the Ahold scandal in the Netherlands, (large) stock option packages 
were considered as one of the factors that had triggered these events. It is 
believed that executives, being motivated by large option grants, became fixated 
on share prices and started to take excessive risks, which led to these scandals 
(Hall and Murphy, 2003). This has stimulated the development and introduction 
of other, more socially acceptable, forms of equity-based compensation, of 
which the performance share is the prime example. The preference for shares to 
options has been explicitly expressed by compensation and corporate 
governance experts as well as (be it more implicitly) by institutional investors. 
From a corporate governance point of view therefore, shares are clearly favored. 
Thus, in order to avoid being criticized by society in general and investors in 
particular, a switch to performance shares is the best and definitely the easiest 
way to go for remuneration committees. 
 
This shows that the implementation of performance shares and deferred 
bonus plans also has a great symbolic value. By implementing a performance 
share plan, companies: a) show that they take an interest in aligning the interests 
of managers and shareholders and b) show their commitment to good corporate 
governance standards. Westphal and Zajac (1994) found evidence that the 
adoption of a long-term incentive plan is often used in a symbolic context. By 
adopting such a plan, companies give proof of their legitimacy and show the 
investment community that they take its interests to heart. 
 
The increased adoption of performance share plans and deferred bonus 
plans can also be a reflection of ‘copycat behavior’, which is closely related to 
the legitimization argument. To remuneration committees, who are expected to 
provide an economically sound and transparent pay package, the remuneration 
practices of other ‘leading’ companies provide an excellent yardstick (Girma et 
al., 2002).  
 
Technical considerations in favoring shares 
 
Besides symbolic advantages, performance share or share retention plans 
have some fundamental characteristics that make them more attractive and 
 69
Management, Vol. 14, 2009, 2, pp. 61-79 
D. Swagerman, E. Terpstra: Trends in Dutch executive compensation 
reliable than stock options. Options appear to have a number of negative 
incentive effects as compared to performance shares. First, since options only 
reward stock price appreciation, executives are given the incentive to cut 
dividends (Lambert et al., 1989). Second, payout is not so much dependent on 
relative performance evaluation, but more on general market trends. Although 
performing poorly, executives can still profit from huge windfalls by cashing in 
on their options in a bull market. On the other hand, they may get punished for a 
good performance in a bear market (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Third, large 
option grants can increase the dilution of share capital, thereby lowering 
shareholder value. Finally, since stock option plans have a fixed term, stock 
option pay is susceptible to ‘pump and dump’ behaviour and earnings 
management. As a consequence, doubts have risen regarding the effectiveness 
of stock option plans, which might have resulted in the switch to other forms of 
equity-based compensation. 
 
Ever since the bull market in the ’80s (when options were first introduced 
on a large scale), executives have continuously benefited from large option 
exercise gains. It is therefore not surprising that from the executives’ point of 
view, options are a favourite form of compensation. After the crash of the 
Internet boom in 2001, however, all outstanding option grants were washed 
away, with little prospect of any payouts in the short-term. The drawbacks of 
option plans in an economic bear market became clearly visible and alternatives 
were sought that would offer the executive a more stable payout. In the case of 
performance shares, payout is still granted even when the stock prices are 
decreasing (payout depends for the largest part on the attainment of the 
performance condition); the gains being in general less, however, than when the 
stock prices increase. Performance shares therefore also offer incentives when 
the share prices have declined; whereas if stock options lose their value, 
incentives are lost since a positive payout is no longer likely to happen. 
 
The key factor that most probably triggered the switch from options to 
shares is the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS 2). Under IFRS 2, companies have to account for their option grants in 
the Profit and Loss Account. This has created a playing field among all equity-
based compensation, taking away the financial advantages of stock options. In 
addition, the Dutch tax regime has changed, which has abolished the preference 
for stock options. For example, Perry and Zenner (2001) have found evidence 
that the regulatory system has a considerable effect on the compensation 
decisions of remuneration committees. Since the clear advantages of stock 
option pay have disappeared, its efficiency has clearly diminished, offering 
possibilities for other forms of long-term incentive pay. 
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TREND 3: Sharp increases in the value of the executive’s total 
compensation package triggered by a rise in equity-based compensation. 
 
The analysis on the total compensation of executives shows that, in 
particular, the executives of companies that introduced performance shares 
witnessed large increases in the value of their equity-based pay package. 
Companies that introduced performance shares in 2003 or 2004 saw a median 
rise in the value of their equity-based pay package of 127%. Companies that 
kept the same LTI package had an increase in value of 35%. This figure does 
not even include the value increases caused by deferred bonus plans, often 
implemented at companies that had also introduced performance shares. We can 
therefore conclude that the introduction of performance shares has led to a 
significant rise in the value of the pay package. 
 
The analysis also shows that companies that stuck with their stock options 
witnessed a decrease in grant value of 46% (2002-2004). Companies that 
introduced performance shares and also held on to stock options (in a 
performance unit plan or two separate plans) saw a median decrease of 32% in 
the option package value in the period 2002-2004, which included an increase 
in value of 33% from 2003 to 2004. Whereas one would expect to see sharp 
decreases in stock option grant value at companies where performance shares 
had been introduced (to make the switch on a cost neutral basis), this has not 
been the case. Besides the value increases that the introduction of performance 
shares has brought to the package, the remaining option grant value has also 
increased. 
 
Increasing share prices and a preference for equity-based pay 
 
First of all, there is a rather technical explanation for the increase in value 
of the equity-based compensation package. We have established that almost 
30% of the companies award options on a fixed number basis, and that there is a 
considerable number of other companies that partly base their grants on fixed 
numbers, such as companies that award options on a discretionary basis. The 
options granted in the spring of 2002 (the usual time to grant options) were still 
subject to relative high exercise prices (AEX=500). However, one year later, 
most stock prices had dropped considerably (AEX=300), followed by a 
(relatively small) bounce up again in 2004 (AEX=350). As a result, companies 
offering a fixed number option (or share) package saw the value of the package 
decrease significantly in 2003, to increase again in 2004. Thus, the basis on 
which options or shares are granted has significant consequences for their value. 
The data also show this; the grant values significantly dropped in 2003 
compared to 2002. On the one hand, one could argue that executives may either 
profit from share price increases or get punished for share price decreases in the 
 71
Management, Vol. 14, 2009, 2, pp. 61-79 
D. Swagerman, E. Terpstra: Trends in Dutch executive compensation 
value of next year’s grant, but on the other hand, this way of granting could also 
lead to equity grants of inefficient sizes (too large or too small to stimulate 
incentives). 
 
The fixed number explanation, however, only partly accounts for the 
increases that have been observed. Probably the most important explanation for 
the large increases in value of equity-based compensation is that many 
companies have deliberately enlarged this part of the pay package. The 
appreciation for equity-based compensation (and in particular shares) has 
steadily grown in the Netherlands due to the strong alignment of the interests of 
shareholders and managers. In the Dutch corporate world, more emphasis is 
placed on good corporate governance and shareholder value creation, and 
combined with an increased shareholder pressure that is legitimized (Westphal 
and Zajac, 1994); equity-based compensation has come to be regarded more and 
more as an important component of the pay package. To keep compensation 
packages competitive, companies have enhanced their equity-based pay 
following a number of ‘leading’ companies, thereby making a large equity-
based pay package common market practice. 
 
In addition, a growing number of companies have indicated that they strive 
for an at target 1/3 fixed, 1/3 short-term variable and a 1/3 long-term variable 
composition of the total pay package. In particular, the 1/3 long-term variable 
part had to be increased to amount to a value of 100% of the base pay. 
However, many companies have already surpassed this 100%; the median 
equity-based pay value at AEX companies has already amounted to 101% of the 
base pay in 2004 and is still increasing. It is therefore expected that in the 
future, the long-term variable part of the pay package will rise only further and 
play an increasingly important role in the pay package of Dutch executives. 
 
Foreign executives and valuation consequences 
 
Another explanation for the growing preference for equity-based 
compensation might be the rise in the number of foreign executives in the Dutch 
boardroom. In 2004, almost 50% of the CEOs of the 25 largest Dutch (AEX) 
companies were foreign, whereas this was only 25% in 2002. These foreigners, 
in particular Anglo-Saxons, often have different attitudes toward the level and 
structure of executive pay since it is, in general, higher in their country of origin 
and more closely aligned with shareholder value. Foreign executives are usually 
also more internationally focused and like to compare their pay packages to 
those of international competitors, which often consist of higher amounts than 
the pay packages of major Dutch firms, and which have a clear pay-
performance relationship. Drawing solid conclusions about a causal relationship 
between the number of foreign executives and the height and structure of 
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executive pay is, however, not possible since the data are, in general, too 
limited. What we unmistakably see here, however, is a trend that could 
significantly impact the future of executive compensation. 
 
Finally, one could argue that supervisory board directors have not been 
sufficiently aware of the actual changes in value that the switch from options to 
performance shares has caused. The valuation techniques used in this study may 
be distinct from those used by supervisory directors and consultancy firms. As a 
consequence, the calculations made by supervisory board directors might have 
resulted in different outcomes, causing them to underestimate the real fair value 
of the grant. Instead of making the switch from options to shares on a cost 
neutral basis, the total equity-based pay package has consequently increased 
considerably. This explanation, however, only applies to a few single cases 
since many companies explicitly state that increases in LTI value were 
consciously planned. 
 
6. POST-RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS 
 
In the years following the above research, the continuation of the identified 
trends could be observed. Even though there have not been any updates to the 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code, the prescribed guidelines, in combination 
with a large degree of public scrutiny, have led Dutch executive compensation 
arrangements to be continuously similar among companies. In the years 
following our research, more companies have replaced their stock option plans 
and replaced these by performance share plans, the large majority with relative 
TSR as (one of the) performance measure(s). Furthermore, the total 
compensation value of executive packages has increased further in the 
following years, primarily caused by larger LTI grants.  
 
There is a remarkable similarity visible with remuneration structures in the 
UK as they were a couple of years ago. After the implementation of several 
corporate governance guidelines and the strengthening of investor associations, 
remuneration packages developed in a similar homogeneous way as now visible 
in the Netherlands. Not coincidentally, the structure of remuneration is very 
similar in both countries, unlike those in other continental European countries. 
The Dutch Corporate Governance Code was heavily inspired by the UK 
Combined Code, and influential remuneration consultants looked closely at UK 
practices. Furthermore, there is a large degree of compulsory disclosure in both 
countries which stimulates copycat behavior. 
 
 It is, therefore, interesting to see whether Dutch remuneration structures 
follow a similar path as UK structures did in the last couple of years. After 
executives and remuneration committee members realised that the standardized 
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structures were not that effective in providing incentives and a fair reward for 
performance after all, remuneration packages have diversified into more 
company specific arrangements, although they still remain heavily influenced 
by guidelines and scrutiny. A similar pattern may appear in the Netherlands 
(first complaints of executives have already appeared in popular press), and 
now the moment is there that the first cycle of new structures is up for review. It 
will be interesting to see whether one will stick to this uniform design or go for 




This study has reviewed the Dutch executive remuneration practices and 
identified several trends. The first major trend that we identified is that in recent 
years, the structure of many incentive plans has been revised and that a renewed 
focus on the discretionary powers of the supervisory board has emerged. Under 
the influence of the Tabaksblat Code and outside investor pressure, many 
companies have added performance conditions to their option and share plans 
and have made sure that the bonus plan measures are ‘previously determined, 
measurable and influential’. The most recent type of Dutch executive 
compensation, relative TSR performance share plans, might on the one hand 
seem an appropriate and responsible way to reward an executive (since 
companies have to perform better than their competitors), but on the other hand, 
the complexity of such plans might lower their value from the executives’ point 
of view.  
 
Thus, are Dutch executive compensation arrangements effective? The large 
increases in pay have certainly improved the position of Dutch companies in 
their quest for international top managers. One could question, however, 
whether the current pay levels are really necessary to attract and retain 
executives, and if these levels are therefore efficient. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether money really is the key driver of an executive to join and 
stay at a company, and if this focus on pay arrangements actually crowds out 
the executive’s intrinsic motivation.  
 
Although Dutch managerial pay packages have increasingly been 
composed to motivate executives, it is questionable whether they really do since 
firm- and manager-specific variables seem not to have been taken into account. 
Corporate governance requirements may furthermore limit the possibilities for 
an optimal design from an incentive point of view. This suggests that the 
current pay packages might not be optimal to provide the best incentives to 
motivate executives.  
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Overall, however, Dutch pay packages seem to increasingly reward 
executives in an effective way. Incentive plans are more and more designed to 
avoid any perverse incentives and prevent windfall gains, which are not earned 
by performance, but merely by sheer luck. Obviously, perverse incentives 
cannot be completely ruled out. We can conclude, however, that the incentive 
plan design seems to have improved for the better in the past few years.  
 
On the other hand, a growing number of companies have made part of the 
annual bonus payout dependent on the discretionary judgment of the 
supervisory board. This suggests that supervisory board directors have become 
more engaged in the pay setting and performance evaluation process.  
 
The second major trend is that new forms of long-term incentive 
arrangements have been introduced. In particular, performance share plans have 
replaced option plans, and deferred bonus plans have been added to the pay 
package. This seems to have been triggered by the negative reputation of stock 
options, the fact that performance shares are, in general, reviewed more 
positively (and are therefore considered as legitimate by the investment 
community), copycat behaviour, fundamental flaws in the option plan design, 
the more stable payout that performance shares offer, the compulsory expensing 
of stock options under IFRS 2, and a changed tax regime. Furthermore, a great 
deal of effort has been put into eliminating the risk of perverse incentives.  
 
These findings lead to some remarkable conclusions. First of all, the new 
regulations (Tabaksblat Code, IFRS 2) have had a clear effect on the structure 
of executive pay arrangements. Although not legally binding, most companies 
have chosen to comply with the principles of the Tabaksblat Code, most likely 
for reasons of legitimization. However, these principles do not always need to 
be efficient from an economic point of view. Hall and Murphy (2002) argue that 
long vesting periods, and quite likely also performance conditions, lower the 
ratio between the value as perceived by the executive and the cost for the 
company, thereby lowering the incentive levels. Therefore, one could argue that 
the principles laid down in the Tabaksblat Code, which constrain the above-
mentioned practices, might not be efficient in an economic way. Furthermore, 
the tendency of remuneration committees to attach ever more vesting 
restrictions to long-term incentive plans, might not be the best way to motivate 
executives who may no longer be able to see the link between behavior and 
payout.  
 
This research has offered a profound insight into Dutch executive 
compensation practices. It is, however, not without limitations. It focuses on a 
relatively small selection of Dutch companies. This means that the research 
results specifically apply to this particular sample and are difficult to generalize 
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to other research populations. The limited size of the Dutch corporate sector 
has, however, prevented a broader scope. Still, the population consists of many 
large multinational companies that compete in an international environment. In 
their specific context, the results of this study can therefore be compared with 
those of other studies conducted in, for example, the US and the UK, which also 
focus on the major companies. Having provided initial insights into this topic, 
this study could serve as a valuable starting point for future research into 
executive compensation arrangements in the Netherlands, providing a broader 
understanding of the efficiency of Dutch executive contracts and the influence 
of political interference on these contracts.  
 
What makes the findings of this paper particularly interesting is that they 
show the specific situational context in which executive compensation 
arrangements are made in the Netherlands. We have identified clear trends in 
equity-based pay, which have evolved in a context of specific regulatory 
requirements and environmental pressures. Furthermore, the questions about the 
economical effectiveness of the current arrangements have been raised. 
 
Additional research could also be directed at the effects of external 
benchmarking on the level and structure of executive pay. Does external 
benchmarking lead to a racketing-up of pay and does it crowd out the intrinsic 
motivation of executives? Another interesting topic of research could be the 
degree of managerial entrenchment in the Dutch corporate governance system. 
Most research on this issue has, so far, explicitly focused on the characteristics 
of the Anglo-Saxon unitary governance system, but given the specific 
characteristics of the Dutch governance system, it might be useful to initiate a 
study on the basis of this specific context. Does managerial entrenchment have 
effects on the Dutch executive pay arrangements? Particularly interesting could 
be the question whether executives are able to influence the composition of the 
benchmark group, which might result in large pay increases. 
 
Although this research has offered an insight into the Dutch executive 
compensation practices, it is not without limitations. It specifically focuses on a 
relatively small selection of Dutch companies. This means that the research 
results apply specifically to this particular research sample and are therefore 
difficult to generalize to other populations. The limited size of the Dutch 
corporate sector has, however, prevented a broader scope. Still, the population 
consists of many large multinational companies that compete in an international 
environment. In their specific context, the results of this study can therefore be 
compared with those of other studies conducted in, for example, the US and the 
UK, which are also focused on the largest companies. Most observations in this 
paper have been based on a combination of a qualitative assessment of the 
empirical research results and a literature study, and can therefore not always 
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count as scientific evidence. They can, however, serve as a trigger for future 
research into compensation practices in this unique situational context. 
 
A final interesting subject for future research might be the consequences of 
the introduction of relative TSR plans, which in recent years have been 
introduced massively in Dutch companies and are often considered as having 
significant value. In particular, the question of how executives perceive the 
value of these kinds of plans in comparison with the company’s costs might 
considerably increase the insight into the incentive effects and efficiency of 
these plans. This study may serve as the basis for many other interesting topics 
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U ovom se radu opisuju trendovi u dizajniranju ugovora o plaćanju nizozemskih top 
menadžera. Da bi se unaprijedilo poznavanje ovog problema, analizirani su podaci o 
kompenzacijama izvršnih članova odbora direktora 71 nizozemske korporacije uvrštene 
na tržište kapitala u periodu od 2002. do 2004. godine. Rad polazi od premise da 
specifični režim korporacijskog upravljanja i uvjeti u okruženju presudno utječu na 
ugovore o kompenzacijama. Na temelju teorijskog istraživanja, u kojem se kombiniraju 
empirijski rezultati i pregled literature, ustvrđuje se da se optimalni pristup 
kompenzacijama postiže kompromisom između poštovanja standarda korporacijskog 
upravljanja (na temelju kojeg se optimiziraju potencijalni poticaji i smanjuju negativni 
poticaji menadžmentu) i težnje za ponudom konkurentnog paketa kompenzacija. Čini se 
da se ovaj kompromis razlikuje u svakom poduzeću, kao i u vremenu u kojem se 
promatra. Relevantnost ove studije je dvostruka: prvo, njezini rezultati bi mogli pomoći 
u oblikovanju javne debate o plaćanju top menadžmenta u Nizozemskoj. Nadalje, ona 
može poslužiti kao nacrt za buduća istraživanja na temu kompenzacija top 
menadžmenta u specifičnom kontekstu nizozemskog sustava korporacijskog 
upravljanja, kao i pomoći u kreiranju optimalnih kompenzacijskih paketa. 
 78
Management, Vol. 14, 2009, 2, pp. 61-79 
D. Swagerman, E. Terpstra: Trends in Dutch executive compensation 
 79
APPENDIX I. POPULATION FOR THIS STUDY 
 
































































Sligro Food Group 
Stern Groep 
Telegraaf 
Ten Cate 
TKH Group 
Univar 
USG People 
Van Lanschot 
Wegener 
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